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This paper elaborates a novel hypothesis regarding the observed predictive relation
between ﬁnger gnosis and mathematical ability. In brief, we suggest that these two
cognitive phenomena have overlapping neural substrates, as the result of the re-use
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INTRODUCTION
Finger gnosis, alternatively calledﬁnger recognitionorﬁnger local-
ization, is the presence of an intact ﬁnger schema or “ﬁnger
sense” (Gerstmann, 1940). A variety of neuropsychological tests
have been designed to assess the presence of ﬁnger gnosis, or its
absence – ﬁnger agnosia – in neuropsychological populations. In
one common test (Baron, 2004), the examiner shields the partic-
ipant’s hand from view and lightly touches one or more ﬁngers.
The participant is asked to identify which ﬁngers were touched.
Finger gnosis tests have been used by neuropsychologists to pro-
vide an indication of parietal lobe damage (Gilandas et al., 1984).
Finger agnosia is one of a constellation of symptoms in Gerst-
mann’s syndrome, along with acalculia, agraphia, and left–right
disorientation. Gerstmann (1940) identiﬁed ﬁnger agnosia or the
loss of “ﬁnger sense” as the core deﬁcit of the syndrome.
Perhaps surprisingly, recent research is demonstrating links
between ﬁnger gnosis and mathematics ability in neuropsycholog-
ically normal children. For instance, Fayol et al. (1998) discovered
that a set of neuropsychological tests, including tests of ﬁnger gno-
sis, was the best longitudinal predictor of Grade 1 children’s math
scores. This ﬁnding was conﬁrmed by Noël (2005), who demon-
strated that children’s ﬁnger gnosis scores predicted accuracy and
ﬂuency on a variety of mathematical tests, both concurrently in
Grade 1 and longitudinally one year later. University students’
ﬁnger gnosis scores also predict calculation skill, concurrently
(Penner-Wilger, 2013; Penner-Wilger et al., in preparation).
Penner-Wilger et al. (2007) and Penner-Wilger et al. (submit-
ted) found that ﬁnger gnosis was related to children’s number
system knowledge and calculation skill concurrently in Grade 1.
Moreover, Penner-Wilger et al. (2009) found that ﬁnger gnosis in
Grade 1 predicted performance on tasks designed to assess number
representations – number comparison and estimation – in Grade
2. Thus, there is converging evidence for a relation between ﬁnger
gnosis and math ability in both selected and typically developing
populations and evidence to suggest that this relation is mediated
by number representations.
Though a clear relation has been demonstrated between ﬁnger
gnosis and math, what remains unclear is what the true nature of
the relation is. It is possible that the true underlying relation is
correlational, as proposed by Dehaene et al. (2003). Alternatively,
as proposed by Butterworth (1999), the relation may be directly
causal. As a result of our cross-domain modeling approach, we
propose a third option, that the underlying relation between
ﬁnger gnosis and math ability is indirectly causal, the result of
a neural resource shared by ﬁnger representation and number
representation, among other tasks.
In the following sub-sections we ﬁrst outline the two prevailing
views, termed localizationist and functionalist (Noël, 2005), and
brieﬂy review some of the evidence for and against these views.
This is followed by the introduction of a third view – the rede-
ployment view – that explains the relation in terms of a shared
brain region that contributes to both relata. Because the redeploy-
ment view will be less familiar to readers, we provide a much more
detailed account of it than we do of the other views. Section 2 is
devoted to a discussion of the available evidence, which appears
on balance to favor the indirectly causal redeployment view.
THREE VIEWS OF THE RELATION BETWEEN FINGER GNOSIS
AND MATH ABILITY
LOCALIZATIONIST VIEW
On the localizationist view, ﬁnger gnosis is related to math ability
because the two abilities are supported by neighboring brain
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regions in the parietal lobe (Dehaene et al., 2003). The comorbidity
of ﬁnger agnosia and acalculia, as seen in Gerstmann’s syndrome,
is explained as arising from common vascularization to the associ-
ated parietal areas, with damage typically affecting both areas. The
relation between ﬁnger gnosis and math in typically developing
children is a reﬂection of the correlated developmental trajectories
of neighboring brain regions. Consistent with the localizationist
view, Simon et al. (2002) found regions in the intraparietal sulcus
activated for calculation-only, calculation and language, manual
tasks (i.e., pointing), and visuospatial tasks. The localizationalist
view predicts that, like ﬁnger gnosis, all co-located functions such
as left–right orientation and graphia, should be equally well cor-
related with math ability. This prediction, however, is not borne
out. In contrast to ﬁnger gnosis, these co-located functions are
uncorrelated or only weakly correlated with math ability (Noël,
2005). Importantly, on the localizationist view, there is no direct
causal link between ﬁnger gnosis and math ability.
FUNCTIONALIST VIEW
On the functionalist view, ﬁnger gnosis is related to math ability
because ﬁngers are used in the course of math development to
represent quantities and perform counting and arithmetic proce-
dures (Butterworth, 1999)1. Thus, the representations of ﬁngers
and of numbers become linked developmentally. According to
this view, the comorbidity of ﬁnger agnosia and acalculia as well
as the relation between ﬁnger gnosis and math in normally devel-
oping children arise because the representation of numbers is not
only co-located with, but also linked to, the representation of
ﬁngers. The functionalist view predicts that facility in ﬁnger use
(e.g., ﬁnger agility/ﬁne-motor ability) should also predict math
ability. This is in part because on the functionalist view there
is a direct causal link between ﬁnger gnosis and math ability
and, moreover, this link is formed experientially in the course
of normal development. The precise motor control required to
use the ﬁngers to represent quantities and perform counting and
arithmetic procedures is vital for the development of numeracy
(Butterworth, 1999). Thus, it follows that children who can more
easily use their ﬁngers would form a stronger association between
ﬁnger and number. Consistent with the functionalist view, ﬁne
motor deﬁcits are associatedwith counting and calculation deﬁcits
(Barnes et al., 2005), though importantly not with deﬁcits in the
strength of number representations. Despite considerable variabil-
ity in ﬁnger agility in typically developing children, ﬁnger agility is
uncorrelated or only weakly correlated with performance on tasks
assessing the strength of numerical representations – in contrast
to ﬁnger gnosis (Penner-Wilger et al., 2007; Penner-Wilger et al.,
submitted).
REDEPLOYMENT VIEW
In Penner-Wilger and Anderson (2008), we brieﬂy outlined an
alternative view of the relation between ﬁngers and math that
1It should be noted that this use of the term “functionalist” is not in keeping with
its current use in cognitive science, although it is at least compatible with its use
in the history of psychology (e.g., functionalism) more broadly. In any event, the
localizationist/functionalist distinction is taken from the existing literature on ﬁnger
gnosis and math ability, and so we stick with that usage, here (Marinthe et al., 2001;
Noël, 2005).
used as its base the massive redeployment hypothesis of brain
evolution (Anderson,2007a,b,c,2008,2010;Anderson andPenner-
Wilger, 2013). Here we further develop the redeployment view of
the relation between ﬁngers and number.
The massive redeployment hypothesis (MRH) is both a theory
about the functional topography of the cortex, and an account of
how it got that way. According to MRH, neural circuits evolved for
one cognitive or behavioral task (henceforth use) are frequently
exapted for later uses when they perform a low-level function, or
cognitive working that is useful in multiple task contexts. Cog-
nitive workings are low-level operations that are performed by
small, typically local anatomical circuits (Bergeron, 2008). As such,
workings are neither consciously available nor describable at the
higher level of psychological vocabulary. Multiple workings, in
concert, contribute to higher-level cognitive uses.2 According to
MRH, a typical brain area will contribute to many cognitive uses,
across domains, performing the same working across these uses
(Anderson, 2010). That is, one mechanism of cognitive evolu-
tion is analogous to component re-use in software engineering.
Components originally developed to serve a speciﬁc purpose are
frequently re-used in later software packages. The new software
may serve a purpose very different from the software for which the
component was originally designed, but may nevertheless require
someof the same low-level computational workings (e.g., sorting).
Thus, efﬁcient developmentdictates re-use of existing components
where possible. Note that in such re-use, the component just does
whatever it does (e.g., sorts lists) for all the software packages into
which it has been integrated, even if that computational working
serves a very different high-level purpose, or use, in each individual
case.
Two of the tenets of MRH (Anderson, 2010) are particularly
relevant to the goals of this section. First, each brain area is typi-
cally redeployed in support of multiple cognitive uses both within
and across domain boundaries. Second, redeployed areas have the
same working in each of the functional complexes they support.
Anderson (2007b, p. 339) uses the analogy of “ﬁnding the right
letter to go into a box on a (multidimensional) crossword puzzle”
to describe the task of determining a shared cognitive working.
Thus, knowing the many cognitive uses that a brain area supports
will help to determinewhat that brain area contributes to themany
anatomico-functional complexes that it supports.
Preliminary investigations – generally involving data-mining
a large collection of brain imaging experiments – have uncov-
ered evidence for four speciﬁc predictions made by MRH.
First, any given brain area is typically redeployed in sup-
port of many cognitive uses, and such redeployment will not
respect traditional domain boundaries (that is, brain areas
are not domain-restricted entities). Second, differences in
domain uses will be accounted for primarily by differences
in the way brain areas cooperate with one another, rather
than by differences in which brain areas are used in each
domain. Third, more recently evolved cognitive uses will uti-
lize more, and more widely scattered brain areas. And fourth,
2The vocabulary of workings and uses results from the fact that terms like function
and role were used inconsistently (and in fact used by different theorists in opposite
ways) within the cognitive science literature (Bergeron, 2008).
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evolutionarily older brain areas will be deployed in more cog-
nitive uses. See Anderson (Anderson, 2007c, 2008, 2010) and
Anderson and Penner-Wilger (2013) for details of the methods
and results.
How redeployment explains the observed relation
In line with the general ﬁndings of MRH, we propose that one of
the neural circuits integrated into the functional complex support-
ing ﬁnger gnosis is also part of the functional complex supporting
the representation of number. That is, one of the functional cir-
cuits originally evolved for ﬁnger representation has since been
redeployed to support the representation of number and now
serves both uses. Alternatively, the functional circuit may have
originally evolved for a third use and been redeployed for both
ﬁnger and number representation. Regardless, on the redeploy-
ment view, ﬁnger gnosis is related to math ability because part of
the functional complex for number representation overlaps with
the functional complex for ﬁnger representation. Thus, ﬁnger and
number share a common neural circuit – a circuit that performs
a shared working that supports both sorts of representation (see
Figure 1). The comorbidity of ﬁnger agnosia and acalculia as well
as the relation between ﬁnger gnosis and math in normally devel-
oping children arise from the shared neural circuit used for both
representations.
The redeployment view of the relation between ﬁngers and
number is not a localizationist view. On the redeployment view,
ﬁnger and number representations are not just neighboring neu-
ral functions on a correlated developmental trajectory; rather, they
share a common neural substrate forming part of the neural com-
plex supporting each function. Nor is the redeployment view a
functionalist view. Importantly, on the redeployment view the
connection between ﬁnger and number does not rest on the expe-
rienced use of the actual ﬁngers to represent numerosities and
perform arithmetic procedures, though it might suggest reasons
we ﬁnd it natural to use the ﬁngers in this way, and thus might
partially explain the ﬁnding that ﬁnger-counting strategies spon-
taneously appear at an early age for children in almost all cultures
(Butterworth, 1999).
In sum, the primary claim of the redeployment view is that the
functional complexes supporting ﬁnger and number representa-
tion share some neural circuitry. The next section outlines some
speciﬁc predictions arising from this claim, and evaluates existing
empirical evidence for those predictions.
At this point, some readers will surely be wondering: exactly
what cognitive/computational working might account for the
deployment of the shared circuit in these ostensibly very differ-
ent uses? Exploring this speciﬁc question with the care it deserves
would take us very far aﬁeld, for in fact the circuit in question is
used not just in ﬁnger and number representation, but in a large
number of other tasks, including word generation (e.g., Franken-
stein et al., 2001), task-switching (e.g., Cools et al., 2004), response
inhibition (e.g., Chikazoe et al., 2007), and more. However, we
can report here that our preliminary analysis – including the con-
struction and testing of a cross-domain computational model of
the shared circuit using Nengo (Eliasmith et al., 2012) – suggests
that an array of pointers has the required computational proper-
ties to contribute to both number and ﬁnger representation, as
well as to the other tasks that appear to rely in part on this shared
circuit. An array is a computational structure that offers ordered
storage, while a pointer offers the capacity to index both differ-
ent memory locations and data types. How such a computational
structure serves the multiple uses supported by the circuit, how
we approach the modeling of its function, how spiking neurons
can in fact implement such a working, and why the results seem to
favor this particular hypothesized working are discussed in detail
in Penner-Wilger et al. (in preparation). For now, we hope that
this brief outline offers the reader some idea of the kinds of things
workings can be, both in general, and in this particular case.
Finally, it should be noted that Dehaene (2005) and Dehaene
and Cohen (2007) outlines a view that, like MRH (Anderson,
2007a,c, 2010), takes as its base the mechanism of exaptation –
whereby features (or functions) that evolved by selection for one
purpose were later adapted to a new purpose. The explanatory
goal of the neuronal recycling theory is to determine how humans
acquire cultural tools such as reading and arithmetic. One notable
difference between the two views is the time course of the mecha-
nisms involved. On the neuronal recycling theory, re-use happens
over the course of development whereas the re-use in MRH hap-
pens over the course of evolution (for a more detailed comparison
of the twoviews, seeAnderson,2010). The twoviewsneednot be in
conﬂict, however, because both evolutionary and developmental
mechanisms reasonably contribute to novel cognitive functions.
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of redeployment view of the relation between finger and number representations.
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Dehaene, however, does not apply neuronal recycling to explain
the relation between ﬁnger and number representation. While it
would be interesting to explore the possible reasons for this, that
will be left to a future paper.
EVIDENCE AND PREDICTIONS FOR THE REDEPLOYMENT
VIEW
If the relation between ﬁnger gnosis and math arises because part
of the neural circuit responsible for the representation of ﬁngers
has been redeployed in support of the representation of number
and now supports both uses then the following predictions should
be borne out:
(1) Brain regions associated with the representation of ﬁngers
should be activated during tasks requiring the representation
of number.
(2) Damage/disruption of the neural substrate should affect both
ﬁnger gnosis and tasks requiring the representation of number.
(3) There should bemeasurable interference between tasks involv-
ing ﬁnger gnosis and tasks involving number representation,
insofar as these would be competing for the same neural
resource.
(4) Individuals with intact ﬁnger gnosis, who could not or did not
use their ﬁngers to represent quantities during development,
shouldnevertheless showactivation in the ﬁnger circuit during
tasks requiring the representation of number.
EVIDENCE FOR PREDICTION 1
Brain regions associated with the representation of ﬁngers are
activated during tasks requiring the representation of number.
Prediction 1 would differentiate redeployment from localization,
given adequate precision; however, it does not differentiate the
redeployment view from the functionalist view, except in very
young children. On both the functionalist and redeployment
views, the representation of ﬁngers and numbers are linked,
with the key difference being the experiential requirement in the
functionalist view.
There is strong empirical support for Prediction 1. Regions
associated with ﬁnger representation within the left parietal lobe
are activated during a variety of mathematical tasks: a region in
the premotor strip (left precentral gyrus; Dehaene et al., 1996; de
Jong et al., 1996; Jancke et al., 2000; Pesenti et al., 2000; Kuhtz-
Buschbeck et al., 2003; Numminen et al., 2004; Pinel et al., 2004;
Venkatraman et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2006) in the left angular gyrus
(Göbel et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2006), and in the horizontal section
of the intraparietal sulcus and in the posterior section of the
superior parietal lobule (Andres et al., 2012). Zago et al. (2001)
found activation of a ﬁnger-representation circuit in the left pari-
etal lobe during adults’ performance of basic arithmetic. Increased
activation was observed in the premotor strip at the coordinates
associatedwithﬁnger representationduringmultiplicationperfor-
mance compared to a digit reading condition. Andres et al. (2007),
using transcranialmagnetic stimulation over the leftM1 hand area
to measure changes in corticospinal excitability, found that hand
motor circuits were activated during adults’ number processing in
a dot counting task. Both sets of authors speculated that the acti-
vation might represent a developmental trace consistent with the
functionalist view. The ﬁndings, however, are equally consistent
with the redeployment view that part of the circuit responsible for
the representation of ﬁngers was redeployed in the representation
of number.
In summary, across a variety of number and ﬁnger tasks,
functional imaging studies have shown overlapping activation in
parietal regions (Andres et al., 2007, 2012). Thus, the ﬁnding that
brain regions associated with the representation of number and
ﬁngers are co-activated is robust, consistent with the functionalist
and redeployment views. It remains possible, however, that future
increases in the accuracy of functional imaging will eventually
produce evidence favoring the localizationist view.
EVIDENCE FOR PREDICTION 2
Damage/disruption affects both ﬁnger gnosis and tasks requiring
the representation of number. Prediction 2 is again inconsis-
tent with the localizationist view, yet it does not differenti-
ate between the redeployment and functionalist views. Studies
where disruption was induced using either repetitive transcranial
magnetic stimulation (rTMS) or direct cortical stimulation pro-
vide converging evidence that disruption in the left angular gyrus
affects both ﬁnger gnosis and tasks requiring the representation of
number.
Rusconi et al. (2005) used rTMS applied to parietal sites to
determine if there was a common neural substrate between num-
ber and ﬁngers. In a series of experiments, they found that rTMS
over the left angular gyrus disrupted both magnitude comparison
and ﬁnger gnosis in adults. Roux et al. (2003) using direct cor-
tical stimulation also found a site in the left angular gyrus that
produced both acalculia and ﬁnger agnosia. Thus, consistent with
the redeployment and functionalist views, stimulation of the left
angular gyrus across methods has been found to disrupt ﬁnger
gnosis along with number comparison and calculation.
EVIDENCE FOR PREDICTION 3
Prediction 3 is that there should be measurable interference
between tasks involving ﬁnger gnosis and tasks involving number
representation, as these would be competing for the same neural
resource. Two methods would allow for the testing of this hypoth-
esis: a dual task paradigm or injection of noise into the system.
As an example of noise injection, electrical stimulation of the ﬁn-
gers (but not of various locations on the forearm) might impact
performance on mathematical tasks.
A recent study by Brozzoli et al. (2008) is relevant here. In this
experiment, participants were asked to press a foot pedal whenever
either their thumb or little ﬁnger on the right hand was electrically
stimulated. Just prior to the onset of this tactile stimulus, partic-
ipants were shown one of four numbers: 1, 2, 4, or 5. With the
hand oriented palm down, response times to the tactile stimulus
of the thumb were positively correlated with the magnitude of the
number, while response times to the tactile stimulus of the little
ﬁnger were negatively correlated with the magnitude. With the
hand oriented palm up, the results were just the opposite. That is,
the task interaction in this case appears to be spatially mediated.
Not only does this demonstrate the predicted cross-talk
between ﬁnger and number circuits, the result is somewhat awk-
ward to explain on the functionalist view. Given the important role
of experience in setting up the ﬁnger–number associations, the
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functionalist view would presumably predict fairly strong associ-
ations between individual ﬁngers and speciﬁc numbers, induced
by the particular counting procedures typically employed. In this
case, participants all employed a counting procedure starting with
the thumb for “1,” and continuing in order down the hand to the
little ﬁnger (“5”). On the functionalist view, one would not expect
these associations to be modulated by hand orientation.3
In contrast, the ﬁnding is compatible with (although not specif-
ically predicted by) the redeployment view. This is because on the
redeployment view, there need be no strong association between
individual ﬁngers and speciﬁc numbers. The entwinement of ﬁn-
ger and number representations is not established by experience,
but is the result of the fact that the two functional complexes share
a neural circuit that does something useful for both. Even if what
is being shared is a particular representational storage resource
such as an array – as was proposed by Penner-Wilger and Ander-
son, 2008 – this would not suggest strong associations between
individual ﬁngers and numbers.
Because on the redeployment view any given neural resource is
being utilized by potentially many different functional complexes,
understanding the functional relationship requires a strong dis-
tinction between the representation itself – what is being stored –
and the representation consumer that is using the thing stored
(Millikan, 1984). The content of a representation depends both
on the intrinsic properties of the representation and on the
details of the mechanism that treats the representation as hav-
ing signiﬁcance. For a simple example, consider the following
representation: 1001. Depending on the context, and on the
assumptions of the interpreter, that representation can be taken
to have the same content as the English phrase “one thousand
and one” or as the Arabic numeral 9.4 It could conceivably also
have alphabetic, numerological, or iconographic content, or be an
instruction set for a Turing machine. The point is: on the rede-
ployment view, the meaning of whatever representation might
be stored in that resource would depend on the representation
consumer, and this meaning could vary greatly depending on the
needs of the functional complexes incorporating the resource.
Note that if two tasks are using the same representational
resource, they will interfere with one another only when the repre-
sentation for one use is incongruentwith the representation for the
other concurrent use. Thus if by chance a ﬁnger stimulus produced
activation consistent with the standing number representation,
there would be no interference. This is relevant because counting
on the ﬁngers, during which process one successively stimulates
(touches, moves, etc.) ﬁngers, is a real-world instance of a ﬁnger
stimulation task that by design produces representations in the
shared representational resource that can provide accurate infor-
mation to consumers in both complexes: I know I have reached
7 because I have just touched this ﬁnger. This suggests a further
implication. Although the details of the procedure one can use to
count on one’s ﬁngers – which ﬁngers are touched in which order
3It would also be hard to explain on any more general theory of association by
experience, such as Pulvermüller (2005) proposes to account for the sensory-motor
grounding of lexical concepts.
4Hence the old joke: there are 10 kinds of people in the world: those that understand
binary and those that do not.
with what meaning – are highly various (Bender and Beller, 2012),
even theoretically arbitrary, the set of such procedures that can
produce representations that would be accurate in both domains
would be constrained by the representation consumers in both
domains; not every procedure will produce representations com-
patible with the available consumers (see Fischer, 2008 and Bender
and Beller, 2012 for evidence that different counting habits can
indeed impact psychological outcomes). Thus, on the redeploy-
ment view, there could exist a set of self-interfering ﬁnger-based
counting procedures. The complementary implication is that there
would be a set of procedures that are more natural and/or easier
to acquire, insofar as they produce representations consistent with
existing consumers, although this would clearly not be the only
aspect of the procedure relevant to ease of acquisition and use
(Bender and Beller, 2012).
Discovering self-interfering counting procedures would seem
to count against both the localizationist view and the functionalist
view. If the intertwining of representations is the result of expe-
rience, then there need be no a priori limit on the nature of the
procedure that would cause the intertwining; and no consistent
procedure that produced intertwining could be self-interfering.
Likewise with the complementary implication: if any such proce-
dure could be learned, then there is no speciﬁc theoretical reason
that one should be easier than another.
Di Luca et al. (2006) report some results relevant to these pre-
dictions. In this experiment, participants were taught various
ﬁnger-digit mappings (two per participant; see Figure 2). They
then showed the participants numbers on a computer screen, and
asked them to press the key underneath the matching ﬁnger.
That participants were able to do this task with very little train-
ing suggests that it is indeed possible to teach alternate systems
in a short time. However, there were signiﬁcant differences in
the number of errors participants made with different mappings.
Naturally,mapping 7 – identical to mapping from the participants’
primary counting procedure – showed very few errors, but inter-
estingly, there were no signiﬁcant differences in the number of
errors made for mappings 1, 7, and 8, even though mapping 1 has
no overlap with 7, and a ﬁve digit overlap with 8. Even more inter-
esting, mappings 2–6 induced signiﬁcantly more errors than did 1,
7, and 8, even though some of them (e.g., 5) have a ﬁve digit over-
lap with 7, and others (e.g., 6 and 2 have ﬁve digit overlaps with
8 and 1). Thus, it does not appear that any strong associations
induced by the familiar counting procedure are responsible for
making mappings 2–6 harder than the rest. There must be some
other explanation, and limits imposed by existing representation
consumers – as predicted by redeployment – offer one plausible
option.
This evidence is more suggestive than deﬁnitive, but it certainly
seems an intriguing line of research that could push bothmodels in
newdirections. For instance, the discovery of a countingprocedure
or ﬁnger–number mapping that did not just reduce performance,
but resulted in systematic errors consistent with the mismatch
between the procedure and the inferred properties of a represen-
tation consumer could be strong evidence for the redeployment
view.
In general, which outcomes in interference experiments would,
and would not, be consistent with the functionalist view might
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FIGURE 2 |The various finger-digit mappings tested in Di Luca et al. (2006).
depend in part on the nature and timeline of the hypothesized
intertwining of representations that occurs during development.
The strongest interpretation of intertwining is that number rep-
resentations and the ﬁnger sense become inextricably linked, even
coming to share the same neural resources. If this is the hypoth-
esis, then perhaps redeployment and functionalism cannot be
distinguished based on interference studies, since they would then
posit the same underlying neural relationship, and differ only with
respect to the account of how that relationship came about. How-
ever, there are weaker versions of intertwining that are consistent
with the original model. For instance, one might expect that num-
ber representations would come to depend on the ﬁnger sense,
but not the reverse. Such a model might be somewhat more plau-
sible developmentally speaking, as although it may be typical to
use the ﬁngers whenever one is doing mathematics, it would cer-
tainly be atypical to think of mathematics whenever one is using
the ﬁngers. At the very least, the various possibilities to be enter-
tained in designing interference experiments suggest the need for
a clariﬁcation of the functionalist model.
EVIDENCE FOR PREDICTION 4
Prediction 4 is that individuals with intact ﬁnger gnosis, who could
not or did not use their ﬁngers to represent quantities during
development, will nevertheless show activation in the ﬁnger circuit
during tasks requiring the representation of number. Prediction
4 is the key in distinguishing the redeployment view from the
functionalist view. Special populations may play a crucial role in
testing this prediction.
If the relation between ﬁngers and number is a functional one,
then the use of ones’ ﬁngers to represent numerosities and per-
form counting and arithmetic procedures would be a necessary
element in the development of numeracy. We have already found
that ﬁnger gnosis in a sample of normally achieving children is
more highly correlated with numeracy and calculation skills than
is ﬁnger agility. This ﬁnding is apparently at odds with the func-
tionalist view, but is consistent with the redeployment view that
the connection between ﬁngers and number does not rest on the
experiential use of ﬁngers to represent number.
One possible route for further investigation would involve
imaging experiments using participants from cultures without the
practice of using ﬁngers in mathematical contexts. It has been
reported, for instance, that various populations including the
Amazonian Pirahã and children in Australia’s Northern Territory
do not use their ﬁngers in support of mathematical tasks (Everett,
2005; Butterworth et al., 2011; Bender and Beller, 2012). The rede-
ployment view would nevertheless predict the use of a common
brain region during both ﬁnger gnosis and number representation
tasks.
Another route would involve investigations using children pre-
senting speciﬁc developmental disorders. Children with spina
biﬁda have both ﬁnger agnosia and poor ﬁnger agility co-morbid
with signiﬁcant mathematical difﬁculties (Bannister and Tew,
1991; Barnes et al., 2005). This ﬁnding has been taken as evidence
for a functional role of ﬁngers in mathematical development, as
children with spina biﬁda would have difﬁculty using their ﬁngers
to form a functional/developmental link with number. However,
as this population also has disrupted ﬁnger gnosis, the ﬁnding is
likewise consistent with the redeployment view.
In contrast, children with developmental coordination disor-
der (DCD) have poor ﬁnger agility, but most have preserved ﬁnger
gnosis (Cermak andLarkin,2001; Hamilton,2002). Thus, children
with DCD are ideally suited as a population with which to test the
redeployment view against the functionalist view. Approximately
6% of children meet the criteria for DCD outlined in the DSM-IV.
On the redeployment view, we predict that children with DCD
and preserved ﬁnger gnosis will show activation in the ﬁnger cir-
cuit during tasks requiring the representation of number such as
magnitude comparison. We are currently designing an imaging
experiment to test this prediction in a population of children with
DCD.
As a ﬁrst indication of support for the redeployment view,DCD
is not generally comorbid with mathematical difﬁculties (Cermak
and Larkin, 2001). Thus, despitemotor problems limiting the abil-
ity to use the ﬁngers to represent numerosities, the representation
of number appears unaffected in children with DCD. This ﬁnding
is consistent with the redeployment view, but presents difﬁculties
for the functionalist view. On the redeployment view, children
with DCD might be expected to show some deﬁcits with arith-
metic, given a functional role for the ﬁngers in the development of
counting and arithmetic procedures, but suchdeﬁcitswouldnot be
expected to impact numerical representation. On the functionalist
view, the use of ﬁngers is necessary for the development of both
numerical representations and arithmetic procedures. Hence, on
the functionalist view, children with DCD would be expected to
show widespread math disabilities as seen in children with spina
biﬁda.
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SUMMARY OF AVAILABLE EVIDENCE
In summary, two of the four predictions that arise from the rede-
ployment view are well supported by empirical evidence: (1) brain
regions associated with the representation of ﬁngers are activated
during tasks requiring the representation of number and (2) dam-
age/disruption of the neural substrate affects both ﬁnger gnosis
and tasks requiring the representation of number. Prediction
3, that there should be measureable interference between tasks
involving ﬁnger gnosis and tasks involving number representa-
tion has yet to be systematically investigated, although we review
some existing evidence that appears to point in that direction.
There is also suggestive evidence for Prediction 4, that individu-
als with intact ﬁnger gnosis, who could not or did not use their
ﬁngers to represent quantities during development, will neverthe-
less show activation in the ﬁnger circuit during tasks requiring the
representation of number.
The data reviewed above strongly favors the ﬁrst two predic-
tions, which are inconsistent with the localizationist view. Even
so, supporters of localization might question the strength of
the results, since the spatial resolution of the imaging methods
employed in some of those studies is poor enough that it is theo-
retically possible for circuits that are in fact segregated to appear to
overlap. Thus, experiments using methods with greater ability to
differentiate between local circuits may be called for. For instance,
in investigating the hypothesized overlap between motor control
and language processing, Glenberg et al. (2008) employed a neural
attenuation paradigm wherein a long session of repeated move-
ments induced changes in the responses of neural populations that
affected processing in a language task.
Although the localizationist view appears to be ruled out, pend-
ing further evidence to the contrary, support for the redeployment
view could not be conclusively distinguished from that for the
functionalist view on the basis of evidence for Predictions 1–3.
Thus, support for Prediction 4 would be the crucial evidence to
conclude that the relation between ﬁngers and number is not func-
tional. We provided evidence consistent with Prediction 4 and
outlined further empirical tests of the redeployment view. That
said, the redeployment and functionalist views need not ultimately
be in conﬂict – it is likely that there is both a developmental and an
evolutionary story to tell about the overall relation between ﬁngers
and mathematical ability.
CONCLUSION
This paper elaborated a novel hypothesis regarding the observed
predictive relation between ﬁnger gnosis and mathematical abil-
ity. In brief, we suggested that these two cognitive capacities have
overlapping neural substrates, as the result of the re-use (“rede-
ployment”) of part of the ﬁnger gnosis circuit for the purpose of
representing number. On balance, the evidence seems to favor the
redeployment account of the relation, over the functionalist and
localizationist accounts. Of course, more research will be needed,
and we have indicated some of the paths such research might
follow.
It is important to reiterate that on the redeployment view, the
neural circuitry shared between ﬁnger gnosis and number repre-
sentation forms only one part of the functional complex necessary
for number representation. In MRH, existing neural circuits are
redeployed for new uses and combined to support new capacities.
Along with the neural circuit shared with ﬁnger gnosis, additional
neural circuits (with additional abstract functional capacities)
are expected to combine in support of the capacity for number
representation.
If redeployment is the right framework for understanding the
relation between ﬁnger gnosis and math, the natural next ques-
tion is: what could the brain region in question be doing for each
of these apparently quite different domains? An important impli-
cation of the redeployment view is that such questions should
be approached using a cross-domain structure-function mapping
methodology, as discussed above. Using this methodology, we
have examined 2164 imaging experiments from the BrainMap
and NICAM databases (Laird et al., 2005; Anderson et al., 2010) to
guide and constrain the answer to what the working of this circuit
is that allows it to support tasks in such apparently different cogni-
tive domains (Penner-Wilger and Anderson, 2011; Anderson and
Penner-Wilger, 2013; Penner-Wilger et al., in preparation).
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